报告简介：

This talk will discuss several pre-communication protocols in a coordination game with incomplete information. Under decentralized decision making, we show that informative communication can be sustained in equilibrium, yet miscoordination arises with positive probabilities. Moreover, the equilibrium takes a partitional structure and messages are rank ordered, with higher messages becoming increasingly imprecise. Compared to centralized decision making (a mediator without commitment), decentralization leads to more informative communication when the miscoordination cost is high, and performs better when the miscoordination cost is intermediate. We also study the case in which the mediator is able to commit to a decision rule beforehand.

报告人简介：

Li Zhuozheng received the BS degree in mechanics and the MS degree in control from Peking University, in 2008 and 2011, respectively, and the PhD degree from the Department of Economics, the Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio USA in 2016. He joined Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (SUFE) in 2016 and is currently an Associate Professor at the College of Business in SUFE. His current research interests include microeconomics, game theory, and industrial organization.

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